Experience And Right To Theorise In Law School

In our everyday law school transactions, a lot of arguments are mounted with different structures, strategies, and approaches attached to them. Sumi Krishna has tried to put into perspectives multiple ways in which dissent is appropriated. Many a times, the arguments to assail validity of another perspective is mounted on the parameter of identity. This identity attack comes from a theoretical basis in many scholarly expositions instead of being plain ‘ad-hominems.’ One such identity-targeted argument is on Experience And Right To Theorise. In law schools of the kind we have, theoretical positions seldom limit themselves to academic papers. For this opinion, theory for me constitutes any argument put forth by anyone from the student body on any pertinent issue. We see the identity-target again being raised in multiple ways to curtail dissent in multiple forms. Yes, I am talking of the “right to theorise” argument. Let me put you in perspective.

You might have often come across situations in law school when the argument you put forth is not merely dealt with in terms of its own merit, rather the locus of questioner is challenged on grounds of “experience and identity.” It happens in many ways. I heavily draw reliance here from Gopal Guru, Habermas, And Sarrukai – all three have tried to give an exposition on “who has the right to theorise (or argue on) experiences and identity of some group. Like Gopal Guru, who once said that a moral right is necessary for any theorizing to occur, this concern extends beyond Guru’s focus on the “theoretical exploitation” of Dalits. It is a widespread issue in many areas of discourse, particularly in law schools. For instance, any attempt to ask questions on the basis of representation in multiple forums is often not answered in terms of the argument’s rationale, but the very identity of the speaker or the lack of moral right of Guru’s archetype. The argument is ever present – the presence of male figures in menstrual leave committee was rejected, for instance, with an irk of “no uterus, no opinion” unless SBC Executive (the student representative executive body at NALSAR) stepped in to clarify the reason of “allyship” behind such inclusion. While reservations in Organising Committees and recruitment forums are questioned even on numeric grounds and arbitrariness, perhaps a range of arguments are mounted not to address the narrow questions raised, but the strawman of perversity haunts our conversations – you cannot speak of experiences or positions in which specified communities should be put in, and if you do on whatever cogent grounds, such speak flows out of a void of a moral right or a sense of hierarchical ‘prescription.’

In real world too, individuals and communities now seek ownership and control over theories about themselves. This trend is particularly noticeable among people not residing in India. Insights and interpretations of the Indian experience—by those who live in India—are frequently formulated by external individuals, who might only spend brief periods in India during academic breaks. These external individuals, despite their intellectual capabilities and access to publishing platforms, create much of the widely recognized literature about India, regardless of their ethnic background.

But the question we must worry ourselves about then is whether such approach is tenable in long run in terms of academic freedom, deliberative liberty, and ideals of market of ideas that have been hard fought for. The answer for me, at least, is ‘no’ here. For multiple reasons that have remained in discussion over time. 

There are numerous human activities where it is inherently impossible for a theorist to have direct personal experience. Should theories about education be written solely by teachers? Take historical analysis, for example; this perspective would imply that unless someone has personally experienced a historical event, any historical writing on that event lacks authenticity. According to this logic, one cannot theorize about extremist movements unless they are part of those groups. This extends to many fields. When we empathize with someone who is suffering, we can internalize some aspects of their experience without having lived through their suffering ourselves. When we condemn caste-based discrimination, we do not need to have experienced it personally. Similarly, advocating for gender equality does not require one to be a woman or belong to a minority community. There are principles, such as human rights and justice, that allow for theorizing without personal experience.

This notion that lived experience is required for authentic theorizing is particularly relevant to discussions about minority communities in India. Consider the example of dining in a restaurant that attempts to replicate rural cuisine. Suppose I eat a traditional millet dish, which is a common rural food in Haryana. What am I experiencing? How does my experience compare to that of a rural person who eats this food daily? This raises questions about the authenticity of experiences and whether an outsider can truly understand and theorize about them. But does that mean that my experience of this food item should have no space in the culinary discussions? When outsiders write positively about a community or field, they are often celebrated. For instance, archaeologists rarely object to outsiders praising their achievements or contributing to the renown of certain archaeologists. Criticism, however, prompts a defensive reaction, where the outsider’s lack of direct experience is used to discredit their perspective. This pattern is evident in writings about Indian culture and society. Praise from outsiders is embraced, but criticism is dismissed on the grounds that outsiders lack genuine understanding. The core issue here is the perceived lack of lived experience. The same is present everywhere even in the law school. With this approach, I hope that we effectively move to the situation where even when community authors see themselves as the ‘sole owners’ of their experiences, they do not really ask for ‘sole authorship’ of their experiences